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Reiki is performed through a technique similar to the laying on of hands Derivation of name The name Reiki derives from the Japanese pronunciation of two Chinese characters that are said to describe the energy itself: '霊 rei' (meaning 'soul',
'spirit' or 'ghost') and 気 ki (Chinese qi, meaning breath or 'life force energy' in this context). Common translations of the term 霊気 reiki are "aura", "soul energy" and "spiritually guided energy." In
English the Japanese noun Reiki is also used as a verb or adjective. Japanese speakers also use the term as a generic "ghostly power" while the Usui Method of Reiki Healing is specifically
usui reiki shiki ryoho. http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/TJP.CHAP2.HTM Quotations For Mercy has a human heart, 2.1 INTRODUCTION Peace has always been among humanity's highest values--for some, supreme. Consider: "Peace at any price."<FONTSIZE=31 "The most disadvantageous peace is better than the most just war."<FONTSIZE=32 "Peace is more important than all justice."<FONTSIZE=33 "I prefer the most unjust peace to the justest war that was ever waged."<FONTSIZE=34 "There never was a good war or a bad peace."<FONTSIZE=35 Yet, we agree little on what is peace. Perhaps the most popular (Western) view is as an absence of dissension, violence,
or war, a meaning found in the New Testament and possibly an original meaning of the Greek word for peace, Irene.
Pacifists have adopted this interpretation, for to them all violence is bad. This meaning is widely accepted among irenologists<FONTSIZE=36 and students of international relations. It is the primary dictionary definition. Peace, however, is also seen as concord, or harmony and tranquility. It is viewed as peace of mind or serenity, especially
in the East. It is defined as a state of law or civil government, a state of justice or goodness, a balance or equilibrium
of Powers. Such meanings of peace function at different levels. Peace may be opposed to or an opposite of antagonistic conflict, violence,
or war. It may refer to an internal state (of mind or of nations) or to external relations. Or it may be narrow in conception,
referring to specific relations in a particular situation (like a peace treaty), or overarching, covering a whole society
(as in a world peace). Peace may be a dichotomy (it exists or it does not) or continuous, passive or active, empirical or
abstract, descriptive or normative, or positive or negative. The problem is, of course, that peace derives its meaning and qualities within a theory or framework. Christian, Hindu,
or Buddhist will see peace differently, as will pacifist or internationalist. Socialist, fascist, and libertarian have different
perspectives, as do power or idealistic theorists of international relations. In this diversity of meanings, peace is no different
from such concepts as justice, freedom, equality, power, conflict, class, and, indeed, any other concept. All concepts are defined within a theory or cognitive framework--what I have called elsewhere a perspective.<FONTSIZE=37 Through a perspective peace is endowed with meaning by being linked to other concepts within a particular perception of reality;
and by its relationship to ideas or assumptions about violence, history, divine grace, justice. Peace is thereby locked into
a descriptive or explanatory view of our reality and each other. My perspective, which sees peace as a phase in a conflict helix, an equilibrium within a social field, has been
presented in the previous four volumes.<FONTSIZE=37a In this Chapter I will review this perspective, make clear the imbedded meaning of peace, describe its related qualities
and dimensions, and prepare for considering alternative conceptualizations in the next Chapter. This and Chapter 3 are thus the prologue to my subsequent theory of a just peace. 2.2 PEACE AS A SOCIAL CONTRACT My perspective and associated meaning of peace are best summarized through a number of social principles.
These have been documented and the evidence given for them elsewhere,<FONTSIZE=38 as will be noted for each. 2.2.1 The Conflict Principle Conflict is a balancing of powers among interests, capabilities, and wills.<FONTSIZE=39 It is a mutual adjusting of what people want, can get, and are willing to pursue. Conflict behavior, whether hostile actions,
violence, or war, is then a means and manifestation of this process. 2.2.2 The Cooperation Principle Cooperation depends on expectations aligned with power. Through conflict in a specific situation, a balance of powers
and associated agreement are achieved. This balance is a definite equilibrium among the parties' interests, capabilities,
and wills; the agreement is a simultaneous solution to the different equations of power, and thereby the achievement of a
certain harmony--structure--of expectations. At the core of this structure is a status quo, or particular expectations over
rights and obligations. Conflict thus interfaces and interlocks a specific balance of powers and an associated structure of
expectations. Cooperation--contractual or familistic interactions<FONTSIZE=310--depends on a harmony of expectations, a mutual ability of the parties to predict the outcome of their behavior. Such is,
for example, the major value of a written contract or treaty. And this structure of expectations depends on a particular balance
of powers.<FONTSIZE=311 Thus, cooperation depends on expectations aligned with power. 2.2.3 The Gap Principle A gap between expectations and power causes conflict. A structure of expectations, once established, has considerable
social inertia, while the supporting balance of powers can change rapidly. Interests can shift, new capabilities can develop,
wills can strengthen or weaken. As the underlying balance of powers changes, a gap between power and the structure of expectations
can form, causing the associated agreement to lose support. The larger this gap, the greater the tension toward revising expectations
in line with the change in power, and thus the more likely some random event will trigger conflict over the associated interests.
Such conflict then serves to create a new congruence between expectations and power. Conflict and cooperation therefore are interdependent. They are alternative phases in a continuous social process<FONTSIZE=312 underlying human interaction: now conflict, then cooperation, and then again conflict.<FONTSIZE=313 Cooperation involves a harmony of expectations congruent with a balance of powers achieved by conflict. 2.2.4 The Helix Principle Conflict becomes less intense, cooperation<FONTSIZE=314 more lasting. If interaction occurs in a closed system or is free from sudden, sharp changes in the conditions of
a relationship (as, for example, if one party to a business contract goes bankrupt, or a signatory to a regional military
alliance with the United States has a military coup), then through conflict and cooperation people gradually learn more about
each other, their mutual adjustments come easier, their expectations more harmonious and lasting. Conflict and cooperation
thus form a helix, moving upward on a curve of learning and adjustments, with the turn through cooperation being more familistic
and durable; that through conflict shorter and less intense.<FONTSIZE=315 2.2.5 The Second and Fourth Master Principles Through conflict is negotiated a social contract.<FONTSIZE=316 As mentioned, conflict is a balancing of powers--a conscious or subconscious negotiation of opposing interests, capabilities,
and wills. This process determines some implicit or explicit, subconscious or conscious social contract. It is social in involving
a relationship or interaction between two or more wills. It is a contract in that there is an agreement--a harmonization of
expectations. It is this social contract that is peace within social field theory. Peace, then is determined by a process of adjustment
between what people, groups, or states want, can, and will do. Peace is based on a consequent balance of powers and involves
a corresponding structure of expectations and patterns of cooperation. Moreover, peace may become unstable when an increasing
gap develops between expectations and power, as here defined,<FONTSIZE=317 and may collapse into conflict, violence, or war. 2.3 THE NATURE OF A SOCIAL CONTRACT Social contracts, the structural basis of peace as here defined, take many forms that interconnect and overlap
in diverse, complex ways to order social communities and organizations. I can hardly engage here this variety, which would
itself require a volume.<FONTSIZE=318 Rather, I shall simply outline the diversity of social contracts, especially so that the nested, overlapping, and multilayered
nature of social contracts, and thus peace, is clear. Throughout the following discussion three points should be kept in mind. First, as mentioned, a social contract is the
outcome of parties balancing their mutual interests, capabilities, and wills, and is based on a particular balance thus achieved--a
balance of powers. Second, the powers constituting the balance are not necessarily coercive or authoritative; threat or legitimacy are not
the only bases for social contracts. Altruistic, intellectual, or exchange powers (based on love, persuasion, or promises,
respectively) may dominate. Thus, a social contract may be a marriage agreement, an understanding developed among scientists
over a disputed theory, or a sale in a market.<FONTSIZE=319 Third, a social contract--this peace--is only a phase in a conflict helix and is thus a temporary equilibrium in the long-term
movement of interpersonal, social, or international relations. 2.3.1 Expectations As used here, an expectation is a prediction about the outcome of one's behavior.<FONTSIZE=320 A social contract harmonizes certain expectations between the parties; that is, it enables each to reliably predict the
other's responses. Such expectations are varied; our vocabulary for discriminating among them is well developed. Remembering
my fundamental concern with social peace and conflict (and thus I am uninterested in, for example, a legal classification
of contracts), these can be divided into status quo and non-status quo expectations. Within these two divisions I can define
five types, as shown in Table 2.1. . Status quo. The concept of status quo is basic to these volumes. In previous volumes<FONTSIZE=321 I argued that a breakdown of status quo expectations is a necessary cause of violence and war, and I tried to verify
this against empirical results.<FONTSIZE=322 The reason for this necessity is that status quo expectations define the basic rights and obligations of the
parties involved, and therefore affect vital values. These rights and obligations form the two types of status quo expectations.
As Table 2.1 shows, they involve claims, privileges, responsibilities, duties, and so on. Note especially that expectations about property--who
owns what--are part of the status quo. Obviously, the division between status quo and non-status quo expectations is not clear-cut. The criterion of discrimination
is salience to fundamental values, and thus intensity of feeling and commitment. For example, agreements over property (such
as territory) will usually involve strong emotion and commitment, while agreed upon rules or practices, advantages or benefits
are less vital and violations more tolerable. However, we are dealing here with a great complexity of social contracts and
the subjectivity of underlying interests, meanings, and values. In some situations a rule, payment, or service may be a life-or-death
matter or a question of fundamental principle to the parties involved and thus, for this case, a matter of the status quo.
Therefore, the classification of expectations under status quo or non-status quo divisions in Table 2.1 simply attempts to make intelligible the diversity of expectations, rather than to construct conceptually tight demarcations
covering all possibilities. B. Non-Status Quo. One type of non-status quo expectations is distributional, establishing which party can anticipate
what from whom, such as benefits, advantages, and services. The two remaining types guide or prescribe behavior
between the parties. The social contract often includes rules, customs, or practices that provide standards or define customary
or repeated actions. Such may be commands, authoritative standards, or principles of right actions. They may be binding, acting
to control or regulate behavior. Such prescriptive expectations in social contracts are mores (long-term, morally binding
customs), norms, the law-norms of groups,<FONTSIZE=323 or the customary or positive law of societies or states. Even the "rules of morality constitute a tacit social contract"
(Hazlitt, 1964: xii). C. Overall. Regardless of whether the focus is the rights or obligations, the distributions, or the guides or prescriptions
between parties structured by their social contract, these expectations share one characteristic: they circumscribe a region
of predictability, or social certainty, between the parties. With a social contract, each party can reliably foresee and
plan on the outcome of its behavior regarding the other, as over, for example, claims, privileges, duties, or services. What
responses to anticipate, the prospect of reciprocity, the likelihood of particular sanctions, are clear. Social contracts
are thus our social organs of peace, extending into the future mutual paths of social certainty and thus confidence. A. Actuality. In Table 2.2 I list 11 theoretical dimensions along which social contracts vary, and have organized them
into four general types.<FONTSIZE=324 To begin with, social contracts may be informal, as are unwritten understandings between friends or allies; or they
may be formal, as with treaties. They may be implicit, tacit agreements that the parties choose not to mention,
as a wife's acceptance of her husband's affairs; or they may be explicit, such as a verbal contract. They may be subconscious,
as when co-workers unconsciously avoid sensitive topics over which they might fight. Or, of course, the social contract may
be conscious. These three dimensions--in formal versus formal, implicit versus explicit, and subconscious versus conscious--concern the
actuality of social contracts, whether they are a latent agreement underlying social behavior or a manifest compact
of some kind.<FONTSIZE=325 A fourth, quite important dimension defines how a social contract is manifested. A direct social contract is a specific agreement between particular parties. It gives or implies names, dates, places,
and definite expectations. Contracts are usually thought of as this kind, such as a construction contract between two firms
or a trade treaty among three states. However, direct contracts may overlap or be interconnected through the different parties,
and thus form a system of contracts. And these systems themselves may overlap and be interdependent. Out of these diverse,
interconnected, and related direct contracts and systems of contracts will develop more general expectations, such as abstract
rules, norms, or privileges at the level of the social system itself. No one will have agreed to these expectations per se,
nor are they connected to any particular interest, but they nonetheless comprise a social contract (albeit an indirect
one) covering the social system. The prices of goods in a free market comprise such an indirect social contract evolving from
the diverse direct contracts between buyers and sellers.<FONTSIZE=326 In Section 2.3.3 I will present some of the major forms direct contracts may take; in subsequent sections I will describe several orders of
direct and indirect contracts. B. Generality. A second type of theoretical dimension delineates a social contract's generality. One such dimension
concerns whether a contract is unique or common. A unique social contract is a one-time-only agreement within
a unique situation and concerning nonrepetitive events or interaction between the parties. Such is the implicit agreement
wrought in an alley by a thug, whose knife coerces you to hand over your money; another example is a two-hour ceasefire agreement
to enable combatants to clear the battlefield of wounded, or a neutral state granting American relief planes a once-only flyover
to rush food and medicine to earthquake victims in a neighboring state. By contrast, a common social contract involves repeated
events or patterns of interaction. Treaties, legal contracts, constitutions, and charters are usually of this type. Clearly,
the unique-common dimension is a continuum, since between the unique two-minute holdup and the common, overriding political
constitution of a state are a variety of social contracts combining in different ways unique and common expectations. Turning to the second generality dimension shown in Table 2.2, social contracts may be bilateral, involving only two parties, multilateral in covering more than two parties,
or collective. The latter covers a society, community, or a group. Constitutions or charters are of this type, as are
an organization's bylaws. While this may seem clear enough, there is an intellectual trap to avoid here--that of always viewing
collective social contracts as necessarily constructed, designed, or the explicit and conscious outcome of a rational process
of negotiation.<FONTSIZE=327 Collective contracts also may emerge from the interwoven, multilayered, bilateral and multilateral social contracts crisscrossing
a society. The integrated system of abstract rules, norms, mores, and customs spanning a society form an indirect, collective
social contract. It is implicit and informal; its expectations are partly conscious, partly unconscious. The system of informal
rules of the road is such a collective agreement governing, along with coextensive formal traffic laws, a community of drivers.
While no group of people may have formally or consciously agreed to a collective social contract--while such may emerge
from various, lower-level social contracts, many of which are conscious agreements--it is still based on a particular balance
of powers, now involving all members of the collective. Consider, for example, the historically rapid dissolution and restructuring
of collective expectations involving rules, customs, and laws that have occurred as a result of conquest (such as Latvia,
Lithuania, and Estonia conquered and absorbed by the Soviet Union in 1939), of military defeat and occupation (as of Hitler's
national socialist, totalitarian Germany), or revolution (witness the French and Russian Revolutions, or the 1974-1978 Cambodian
social revolution of the Khmer Rouge). Of course, not all norms, customs, or customary laws are changed, no more than a new
bilateral or multilateral contract will discard all previous expectations. New social contracts build on the old. However,
a new social contract, collective or otherwise, will be meaningfully different; associated interaction between the parties
will change significantly. Finally, the third dimension defining a contract's generality may be narrow, middle range, or overarching.
A narrow contract concerns only a few interests, events, or behaviors, such as a contract to paint a car, a trade treaty increasing
the quota on imported sugar, or the price of a Sony television set.<FONTSIZE=328 An overarching contract develops from, refers to, or spans a whole system of relationships, such as those of a family, the
larger society, or an organization. A marriage contract stipulating duties and rights of spouses, an organization's constitution,
or the system of norms covering a society are some examples. Between the narrow and overarching are a variety of middlerange
social contracts covering or involving a large amount of behavior, but not the whole society. One's work contract, an alliance
between states, and a peace treaty are examples in this middle range. C. Polarity. The third type of dimension shown in Table 2.2 concerns a social contract's polarity. In the dimension of coerciveness, the parties to social contract may voluntarily
accept it, or one or more parties may be coerced into it, either by other parties to the contract or by a third party,
such as in a shotgun wedding or governmentally imposed, union-management contract. Between freely determined and coerced contracts
are those which one or more parties agree to out of necessity. That is, circumstances, the environment, or events leave
virtually no realistic or practical choice. In a one-company mining town where a person has his roots, he may have little,
socially meaningful choice but to contract for work with the company. To defeat Hitler in the Second World War, Churchill
felt he had little choice but to form an alliance with Stalin. A second polarity-type dimension concerns whether a social contract is solidary, neutral, or antagonistic.<FONTSIZE=329 Solidary expectations derive from helpful, altruistic, or compassionate behavior. Such expectations are common among close
friends or relations, lovers, or close-knit communal or religious groups. Antagonistic expectations, however, derive from
mutually competitive, divergent, or opposing behavior. They involve a perception of incompatible purposes, temporarily bound
in a social contract, and a belief that satisfying one's interests entails frustrating those of the other parties. A labor-management
contract achieved after a long, violent strike is such an antagonistic contract; or a truce between traditional enemies, such
as Pakistan and India, North and South Korea, or Israel and Syria. Between solidary and antagonistic contracts lie neutral
contracts,<FONTSIZE=330 those which are strictly a matter of business, a question of the parties coolly and objectively satisfying rather specific
interests. Examples are agreements for a bank loan, renting an apartment, importing cotton, or increasing the postage on international
mail. D. Evaluative. Finally, there is the evaluative dimension. One of these concerns whether a social contract is good
or bad. Fundamental philosophical controversy centers on the idea of good. For the moment, I mean "good" simply in the sense
that one might say a treaty is a good one because it has characteristics that one desires or believes rationally commendable
or divinely inspired.<FONTSIZE=331 A contract may be positive or negative in the same sense as "good" or "bad." There is a potential confusion
in the use of these terms, however, since here a social contract equals peace. "Positive peace" has come to mean, especially
among Scandinavian irenologists<FONTSIZE=332 an existing or ideal social state, such as the achievement of individual potential, as reflected in social equality, for
example. "Negative peace" is then simply the absence of violence. This, however, is a confusion of categories, and leads to
such strange but consistent (by definition) expressions as "a positive, negative peace."<FONTSIZE=333 Simply, I will mean positive as good and negative as bad in qualifying social contracts or peace. A second evaluative dimension defines one kind of good social contract: whether it is just or unjust. It is this dimension
of social contracts that is the major focus of this book. Understanding that a social contract defines a particular peace,
my question is: What is a just peace? My answer, developed in Part II is that justice is the freedom of people to form their
own communities or to leave undesirable ones . For large-scale societies, just peace is promoted through a minimum government.
2.3.3 Forms 2.3.4 Social Orders A social order is a particular arrangement of direct and indirect social contracts forming a meaningful, causal-functional<FONTSIZE=334 whole. Two types of social orders are of concern here. One is that of groups; the other of societies. A. Groups. A group is structured by a direct, overarching social contract that defines members' rights, obligations,
and authoritative roles. Behavior is guided and prescribed by sanction-based law-norms. All this may be codified in organizing
documents, such as a charter, constitution, or bylaws; or these may be informal, implicit, or even subconscious understandings
and norms evolving from the spontaneous interaction and conflicts of group members, as in a family or clan.<FONTSIZE=335 In any case, this social contract may be solidary, neutral, or antagonistic (as in family, work group, and prison, respectively);
it may tightly organize members or leave them unorganized; and it may recruit members voluntarily, through coercion, or out
of necessity. Group goals may be diffused or superordinate; the basis of authoritative roles may be legitimacy or threats.
These diverse characteristics shape the five groups shown in Table 2.4.<FONTSIZE=336
For my purposes here, the most important distinction is between spontaneous groups and voluntary associations on the one
hand, and voluntary, quasi-coercive, and coercive organizations on the other. An organization is structured by an explicit,
formal social contract aimed at achieving some superordinate goal (profit for a business, military victory for an army, segregating
criminals for a prison, education for a university). Expectations are wrapped around this goal: it determines roles, rights,
and obligations, as well as law-norms prescribing behavior. An organization is then an antifield.<FONTSIZE=337 Spontaneous interaction is circumscribed, consigned to regions of social space (the interstices of the organizational chart)
irrelevant to an organization's goals. By contrast, voluntary groups and associations are less organized, not as strongly
directed toward some superordinate goal. Goals may even be absent, diffuse, or unarticulated. Coercion or authority play minor
roles. Within these groups and associations field forces and processes have considerable freedom and scope, as in a family,
friendship group, or neighborhood association. These different groups define different structures of peace, different patterns of our interests and capabilities,
of our powers. B. Societies. The second kind of social order shown in Table 2.4 is the society. The three pure types listed have been discussed at length in Vol. 2: The Conflict Helix<FONTSIZE=338 and their empirical validity was assessed there.<FONTSIZE=339 Here, I need only note the more important relevancies. A society is defined by a division of labor<FONTSIZE=340 and, accordingly, certain shared meanings, values, and norms; social interaction; and a communication system. It is shaped
by an indirect, overarching, collective structure of expectations--a mainly informal and implicit social contract. The form
of social power primarily underlying this contract determines the type of society. An exchange society is dominated
by exchange power; an authoritative society by authoritative power; a coercive society by coercion. By virtue
of the dominating form of power and associated social dynamics, each society manifests a particular dimension of conflict,
with exchange societies least violent; coercive, the most.<FONTSIZE=341 Each type of society is thus a different kind of peaceful order. International relations among societies are of special importance here. Nation-states form an exchange society<FONTSIZE=342 with a libertarian government, pluralistic conflict,<FONTSIZE=343 and associated pluralistic structure of peace. In later discussing international peace I will make use of this social fact.
C. Summary. I have shown the diversity of social contracts, and thus peace, through detailing their various expectations,
dimensions, forms, and orders. I need only underline now the nested, overlapping, and hierarchical complex of such contracts
filling out the structure of a group or society. Consider, for example, a voluntary organization such as a university. It
has an overarching contract defining its purposes, organizational structure, positions, and attendant rights and obligations,
and associated rules and law-norms. Under the cover of these expectations are defined related social contracts and systems
of contracts governing separate administrative functions (such as admission and financial aid), colleges, divisions, and departments.
Within the constraints of the university's overarching expectations, each contract or system has a certain life, depending
on the administrators, deans, and faculty involved. Each teaching department within a college of division achieves its own
informal or formal social contracts establishing rights, obligations, and privileges attendant upon faculty and student rank
and defining the role of students and rules for judging issues before the department. As should be clear, each department,
college, and administrative division will be an arena of conflict establishing or revising such expectations, although the
overarching social contract that constitutes the university remains stable--a region of social peace at its level.
The university itself is within an overarching social contract that is the larger society. Families, Businesses, universities,
governments, churches, are all are collective social contracts within society, which also includes the numberless bilateral
and multilateral social contracts among groups, subgroups, and individuals and the collective contracts ordering subsocieties.
Each social contract is a specific peace within a particular conflict helix; each may have within it lower-level conflict
(for example, a state within a region of international peace may suffer internal guerrilla war and terrorism); each peace
may exist within an ongoing, antagonistic conflict (as internally peaceful states engage in war). Peace is therefore complex, multilayered. To say the least, discussing peace requires being specific about the social contract
involved. To present a theory about a just peace demands clarity about the associated expectations, dimensions, and social
orders. 2.4 CONCEPTUAL LEVELS AND DIMENSIONS OF PEACE The dimensions, forms, and orders of social contracts described above are also, by definition, those of peace. What must
be added here and in the next Section are additional distinctions not usually applied to social contracts but which help locate
peace as a social contract among our diverse conceptualizations of peace. This and Section 2.5 also represent part of my effort at vocabulary building--developing in a systematic manner, and locating in one place, those
terms applicable to peace that will be used in subsequent chapters. Table 2.5 presents the conceptual level and dimensions of peace to be discussed here. 2.4.1 Conceptual Levels A. Levels. Undoubtedly, peace is often conceptually opposed to war. Obviously, then, one conceptual level for
analyzing a just peace involves those social contracts determined by international, civil, or revolutionary war. Peace, however, especially among pacifists, is also opposed to violence. This includes war, of course, but additionally
covers violent acts not ordinarily thought of or legally defined as war. Indeed, in the contemporary world legal war (that
is, war as a legal state of relations invoking special international laws) is rare, while warlike violence is as intense and
prevalent as wars were during past centuries. Nonetheless, this is more than a matter of defining war empirically. Many do
feel that peace, conceptually, applies only to those human relations which exclude personal, organized, or collective violence.
Those opposing the idea of peace to violence or war usually see peace as an absence of such behavior. But a different view,
especially in the East, sees peace as harmony, tranquility, concord. Peace is then conceptually opposed to nonviolent,
antagonistic conflict, such as that manifesting threats and accusations, hostile quarrels, angry boycotts, and riotous
demonstrations. Another concept goes even further, seeing peace as absolute harmony, serenity, or quietude; that is, as opposed to any
kind of conflict, antagonistic or otherwise. Conflict is a general concept meaning, in essence, a balancing of power,<FONTSIZE=344 which may involve not only hostile or antagonistic balancing but also that of intellectual conflict (as in friendly disagreement
over facts), bargaining conflict (as in haggling over a sale price), or a lover's conflict (as when each tries to give the
other the choice of a movie to see). Each of these conflicts ends in a social contract, and therefore in a kind of peace.
I mention this conceptual level for completeness, however. My conceptual focus here, as for all irenologists, will be on peace
at the level of antagonistic conflict, whether violent or not. B. A Threshold. Especially significant for a theory of just peace is the distinction between nonviolent, antagonistic
conflict on one side and violence on the other. There is an empirical threshold here. As I will argue later in Section 7.4.2 and Section 8.2, the conditions for a just peace at the level of violence will increase the amount of nonviolent conflict. A just peace free
from long-term violence is, at the level of societies at least, only possible at the price of peace from nonviolent conflict.
2.4.2 Social Levels A. Levels. Clearly, peace as a social contract occurs at different levels of social relationships. Table 2.5 lists four of concern here. One is international, the level of most historical concern about peace. A second level
concerns the central government or ruling power (such as a dominant religious leader or political party) of a state.
Peace here is the outcome of, or can disintegrate into, revolution or civil war; guerrilla war and terrorism; political turmoil
involving riots, demonstrations, general strikes, and assassinations. A third level involves group relations within states, such as among religious and ethnic groups, nationalities,
classes, castes, unions, and families. A state, at the level of its central government, may be peaceful, manifesting a stable
social contract, while some of its regions may experience continuing group violence. The final level involves the interpersonal
relationships among individuals. B. Crosscutting Levels. Social levels of peace are crosscutting: each of the conceptual levels may refer to any one
of the social ones. Even war is applicable to individual relations, as when conflict goes beyond a violent incident to involve
a campaign of violence to defeat or destroy another person. It should, be clear, then, that there may be peace from war, but not from antagonistic, nonviolent conflict. Moreover,
there may be peace from international war, while internal war rends a state. Conversely, a state may be at peace while engaged
in international war. Peace among states may be widespread, central state governments may be stable and secure, while some
groups in one province, region, or other political subdivision are locked in total war. From the perspective of a particular
citizen, his state and social groups all may be at peace, while personal peace eludes him--he simply may not get along with
his neighbors or co-workers. Peace is thus multilayered and complex. This must be kept in mind in defining a just peace. 2.4.3 Conceptual Dimensions A. The Metalevel. Section 2.3.2 presented major theoretical dimensions of social contracts, and thus of peace. The dimensions considered here and shown in
Table 2.5 refer only to peace as a concept and not the concept of peace. This is like the difference between ethical and metaethical
concepts, or political and metapolitical ones. In each case, the former refers to the content; the latter to the concept about
the contents.<FONTSIZE=345 For example, a peace can be overarching (Table 2.2); a concept of peace can be abstract. B. Empirical Concept. The first such dimension defines whether the concept is empirical, abstract, or theoretical--a
construct.<FONTSIZE=346 An empirical concept<FONTSIZE=347 of peace refers to readily observable phenomena. It is measurable (operational). Peace as absence-of-killing violence is
such a concept; as is peace as an absence of legally declared war or a peace treaty (or any written social contract, for that
matter). C. Abstract Concept. While also referring to empirical phenomena, an abstract concept of peace is not directly observable.
Rather, it usually denotes a bundle of empirical attributes or qualities, or is reflected in patterns of behavior. Examples
are concepts such as status, power, or ideology, which are detached from particular instances or events or specific empirical
characteristics. Abstract concepts provide general, theoretical understanding of social reality, while empirical concepts
are usually common-sense descriptions of immediate perception.<FONTSIZE=348 For general use peace as a social contract would be an abstract concept, although some social contracts may be quite concrete
and hence empirical. The abstraction involved is clearest when we consider implicit, or even subconscious, agreements involving
tacit expectations. The abstract, nonformal rules of the road are part of such an abstract social contract. And consider the
overarching social contract whose expectations define rules and norms spanning society but which no one signed or directly
agreed upon, which few are aware of, but which most obey. Most families are integrated by such expectations that wife and
husband, parents and children have of each other but which an observer would have difficulty defining empirically (although
certainly indicators could be developed, as for status or power). Peace as a social contract is an abstraction within the idea of a conflict helix, which is part of social field theory.
This theory provides an explanation of conflict, violence, war, and peace. So much, I trust, was made clear in Vol. 2: The Conflict Helix and Vol. 4: War, Power, Peace. There are other abstract definitions of peace: For example, peace as law or justice; or peace as concord, harmony, or tranquility.
Often the theoretical context for an abstract definition of peace is not explicit, but nonetheless is clear from the context
within which the concept is developed or used. D. Construct. Finally, peace as a construct<FONTSIZE=349 means that "peace" serves a stepping-stone role in theory. It is a theoretical concept; analytic, not synthetic. The content
given to a construct is not defined independent of a theory but wholly within the operations and deductions of a theory. By
contrast, while measurements or indicators of an abstract concept certainly would be directed by a theory, the actual data
(or content) are collected (or observed) independently. This is a difficult but important idea, and I would like to take a moment to make it clear. Consider a simple explanatory
theory that y = h + tx, where y is the level of armaments of state i, x is the level of armaments of an opposing state j,
and t and h are theoretical coefficients conceptualized as "x's perception of threat from y," and "the hostility that j feels
toward i," respectively.<FONTSIZE=350 This simple explanatory theory says that one state's armaments are a function of those of the opposing state's, depending
on its perception of the threat from the other and its hostility toward it. Now y and x are abstract concepts, since "armaments"
is a concept covering a tremendous empirical diversity of weapons and indicators. Nonetheless, by adding auxiliary statements
to the theory one might measure armaments through such indicators as defense expenditures or number of armed military personnel.
Data on these indicators could then be collected from sources readily available and independent of the theory. However, within this theory, threat and hostility are constructs. No measurement of them or indicators need by given; no
data collected specifically on them. Rather, the coefficients are totally defined by fitting y = h + tx to the data on x and
y. Such a fit could be made by bivariate regression analysis where h is the intercept and t the regression coefficient; y
the dependent and x the independent variables. This gives numerical values to h and t without any specific data collected
on them. As constructs, they would have been given empirical content totally dependent on the theory y = h + tx and data on
x and y. Keeping this simple arms theory in mind, I must now discriminate between the loose and tight versions of
social field theory. In the loose version (specifically, that presented in most of these volumes, especially concerning the
conflict helix), the mathematical structure of field theory is usually background;<FONTSIZE=351 content, conceptual understanding, and explanation are usually foreground. A structure of expectations--social contract--is
treated as an abstraction. It is given ostensive content, such as in discussing a union-management contract, an implicit agreement
ending a family quarrel, an international settlement of a dispute, or the law-norms integrating a group. In the tight theory,<FONTSIZE=352 mathematical structure, substantive interpretation of primitive terms or constructs,<FONTSIZE=353 operationalization, and empirical tests are of concern. The tight theory is meant to be as explicit, formal, and general
as possible. Expectations are constructs weighting behavioral dispositions in a social field and technically function
as canonical coefficients in application.<FONTSIZE=354 And to enhance the theory's generality, I have considered a structure of expectations as implicitly an indirect, overarching
social contract of a social field (such as a spontaneous or self-organizing<FONTSIZE=355 society). This structure is a cooperative component--another construct<FONTSIZE=356--underlying the variation in manifest interaction. It is reflected in common patterns of social interaction, and thus is
empirically measured indirectly only by a mathematically defined axis lying through an empirical pattern of social interaction
spanning society.<FONTSIZE=357 For the tight theory, then, applicable to an indirect, overarching social contract for social fields, peace is a construct.
Its whole meaning is given by the theory; it serves to aid empirical explanation and theoretical understanding; its empirical
content is traced by the cooperative patterns of social interaction. In this Vol. 5: The Just Peace I will not deal with the tight theory, whose role is precise and testable scientific explanation, not intuitive understanding.
The loose theory will provide sufficient framework for our purposes here. And, as in previous volumes, I will treat peace
as an abstraction, even when referring to indirect, overarching social contracts. Incidentally, peace as a construct is not unique to field theory, although as far as I know no other such tight theory
so treats it. Peace as divine grace in Christian theology or as shalom in Judaism, of which one meaning is a covenant
with Jehovah, are constructs. Their empirical meaning is not given directly or abstractly; rather, they are primitive terms
whose content comes from the empirical nature of other, linked theological concepts. Moreover, the concept of "positive peace"
developed by Johan Galtung is a construct within a neo-Marxist theory of exploitation; "positive peace" has no direct empirical
or indirect abstract empirical content, but is defined as the ability of individuals to realize their potential, which in
turn is equated in theory with equality, itself an abstraction measured by various indicators of equality.<FONTSIZE=358 E. Descriptive-Normative. The empirical-abstract-construct dimension of peace concepts is the first conceptual dimension.
The second defines whether the concept of peace is descriptive or normative. A descriptive concept is one simply denoting
some aspect of reality, such as trade, state, or president. A normative concept is evaluative, denoting or implying goodness, desirability, what ought to be, or the negation of
these denotations. Compassion, equality, and exploitation are such normative concepts. Clearly, the same concept may be used
descriptively or normatively depending on context and intent. However, some concepts have a built-in evaluation that even
a careful descriptive analysis may not avoid, such as with the concepts murder, torture, exploitation, charity, and love.
As with love, peace undefined is an implicit good, a hope, desire, a human ideal. "Give peace in our time, 0 Lord."<FONTSIZE=359 In its common usage, peace is normative. However, regardless of the affective connotation of peace, the concept can be used descriptively. For example, if peace
is conceived as an absence of war or a peace treaty, it is possible to write about the peace in Europe since 1945, the peace
of the Versailles Treaty, or the average periods of peace in history, without necessarily connoting that these are good
historical periods (although for pacifists, peace as an absence of war is, ipso facto, good in all contexts). My use of peace as a social contract is meant descriptively. Not all social contracts are good. Some are quite bad,<FONTSIZE=360 as was the horrible peace (as absence of international war) of the Khmer Rouge over Cambodia in 1974-1978 (before the Vietnamese
invasion). Since peace is meant here to be (normatively) as neutral a concept as possible, it is sensible to ask when peace
is good, or (as a subcategory of the good) when it is just--or when bad or unjust. For the very reason I have treated peace
descriptively in previous volumes, even though it is my fundamental normative goal, I now must conclude by pointing out in
this Vol. 5: The Just Peace when peace, so described, is just or unjust and, given my analyses and results, what will foster a just peace. 2.5 QUALITIES OF PEACE 2.5.1 An Existent Other conceptualizations also treat peace as an existing something, such as peace as harmony, integration, or virtue. However,
the currently conventional definition of peace as the absence of violence or war treats peace as a void, a nonexistent. This
creates several analytical problems, which will be mentioned below.<FONTSIZE=364 2.5.2 Dichotomous Peace as an existent is dichotomous: it is or it is not. It would be meaningless to talk about more or less of a
peace, as it would be meaningless to talk about more or less of a contract, a nation-state, a president, or an elephant.<FONTSIZE=365 Of course, a state may be large or small, rich or poor. Likewise, peace varies along several dimensions; it may take on different
forms or social orders.<FONTSIZE=366 It is necessary here, then, to remember the distinction between a peace existing or not and the attributes, form, or order
of the peace that exists. Thus, I might say that peace in the world is increasing and mean that more states are subscribing
to a particular overarching, international peace. Or by saying that peace is more intense I might imply that a specific peace
is involving more and more cooperative interaction. 2.5.3 Internal and External In my view, peace is internal and external. It is a social contract among people or groups involving these
psychological and social realities. The former comprises the parties' expectations and the congruence of these
expectations with their mutual interests, capabilities, and wills. These are all psychological variables. The social reality,
manifesting the harmonization of certain expectations among the parties, may be evidenced in specific documents (such as a
written contract), physical structures (such as certain government buildings), and patterns of cooperative interaction. To
say, then, that peace is an existent means that the particular expectations, meanings, and values within the minds of the
parties and their social manifestations are all causally-functionally<FONTSIZE=367 integrated into a social contract. Thus, like an iceberg, peace seen on the surface of social relations is only a small part
of the overall structure.<FONTSIZE=368 2.5.4 Active Finally, peace as a social contract is active, not passive. It is created through negotiation, adjustment, resolution,
decisions. It comprises predictions (expectations) about the future. It is manifested through cooperative interaction. Its
existence depends on congruence with the balance of powers. It is a phase in the dynamics of the conflict helix. By contrast, peace as the absence of violence or war is passive. True, it may be generated by negotiation and resolution.
But the resulting peace is inactive, inert. It is a social void-something to build a wall around to protect and maintain.
Any condition or structure or lack thereof constitutes such a peace as long as there is no social violence-even a desert without
human life.<FONTSIZE=369 2.6 ADVANTAGES OF Peace conceptualized as a social contract has a number of advantages. First, peace is then defined as part
of a dynamic social process with a well-defined nature; it is given meaning and substance in definite relationship to conflict
and cooperation. Second, peace stands in clear theoretical and substantive relationship to such important concepts as perception, situation,
expectations, interests, capabilities, will, power, status, class, and behavior.<FONTSIZE=370 This gives the nature of peace considerable substantive and theoretical clarity. That is, peace is locked into an overarching
social theory. Third, as a social contract peace is operational, and empirical patterns of peace, so defined, have been well delineated.<FONTSIZE=371 Fourth, because of the theoretical and substantive meaning of peace, peacemaking and peacekeeping policies are given concrete
direction and crucial variables are spotlighted. For example, keeping the peace then depends, most generally, on maintaining
congruence between the balance of powers and the structure of expectations (social contract). This might be done by altering
expectations unilaterally to adjust to changing capabilities, or strengthening will to lessen a developing gap with expectations.<FONTSIZE=372 Fifth, peace as conceptualized embodies a number of psychological principles, such as subjectivity, intentionality, free
will, and individualism.<FONTSIZE=373 This, plus the social principles mentioned in the previous Section, enable a clear and straightforward application of the
social contract theory of justice. As will be shown in the next part, a just peace is a hypothetical social contract of a
particular kind, one to which individuals would fairly and impartially agree. * * * This Chapter has described peace as a social contract. And it has made the necessary definitions and distinctions in order
to compare this idea of peace to alternative conceptualizations.. This will be done in Chapter 3. NOTES * Scanned from Chapter 1 in R.J. Rummel, The Just Peace, 1981. For full reference to the book and the
list of its contents in hypertext, click book. Typographical errors have been corrected, clarifications added, and style updated. 1. Alphonse de Lamartine, Meditations Poetiques (1820). 2. Desiderius Erasmus, Adagio. 3. Martin Luther, On Marriage (1530). 4. Cicero, Letters to Atticus. 5. Benjamin Franklin, Letter to Josiah Quincy (September 11, 1773). 6. Irenology = the scientific study of peace. See Starke (1968). 7. See Vol. 1: The Dynamic Psychological Field (Section 8.3 of Chapter 8). I classify and discuss relevant types of concepts in Section 2.4.3. See also Note 48. 7a. These volumes are: Vol. 1: The Dynamic Psychological Field; Vol. 2: The Conflict Helix; Vol. 3: Conflict In Perspective; and Vol. 4: War, Power, Peace. 8. These principles are presented in Vol. 4: War, Power, Peace (Chapter 20), and are each the subject of chapters in In The Minds of Men (1979a; republished as The Conflict Helix). 9. On the nature and variety of powers, see Vol. 2: The Conflict Helix (Chapters 19, 20, and 21). On interests, capabilities, and wills, see Vol. 2: The Conflict Helix (Chapters 6, 27, 28, and 29). For mathematical definitions, see Vol. 4: War, Power, Peace (Chapter 8 and Section 9A.1 of Appendix 9A). On conflict as balancing of powers, see Vol. 2: The Conflict Helix (Section 29.3 of Chapter 29) and Vol. 4: War, Power, Peace (Part V). Note that I define an interest broadly as any situation--want (or goal)--means complex, which includes sentiments,
roles, values, and ethics. Interests are activated attitudes, stimulated by particular needs, Thus, as treated here, interests
are basic motivational variables. See Vol. 1: The Dynamic Psychological Field (Chapters 19, 20, 21, particularly Section 20.3 of Chapter 20). 10. For the development of different types of social behavior, see Vol. 1: The Dynamic Psychological Field (Part III). For the mathematical development, see Vol. 4: War, Power, Peace (Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 and Section 9A.1 of Appendix 9A). Empirical applications are given in Vol. 4: War, Power, Peace (Chapter 4). 11. Note that the balance of powers is not necessarily of coercion and force, but may combine exchange, intellectual, authoritative,
altruistic, and manipulative powers. Moreover, regardless of power's form: Power = interests X capabilities X will. And the balancing of these powers takes
place in a perceived situation. The balance of powers is thus a multidimensional balance in the minds of the parties involved
and should not be confused with any mechanical and physical balance. 12. In the words of Henry Kissinger (1974: 643), "two world wars and an era of involvement and conflict should now have
taught us that peace is a process, not a condition." 13. This is clearly a dialectical view of conflict and peace. See, for example, Mao (1954: Vol. 2, p. 45): Peace is a property of conflict systems and a homeostatic or cybernetic property that enables the system, in the course
of its dynamic path, to remain in some stated boundary. Where the boundary is drawn is not so important as the machinery by
which the system stays within it wherever it is drawn. Most conflict systems exhibit what might be called a "Break boundary"
at which the system suddenly changes into another or passes some point of no return in its dynamic processes. Thus, marital
conflict may lead to separation or divorce, industrial conflict may lead to strikes, personal conflicts may lead to fisticuffs
at the lower end of the social scale or to litigation at the upper end, and international relations may degenerate into war. |
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